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By WILLIAM VICKREY f
SINCE to the layman insurance is a forbiddingly complicated business,
it is not surprising to find that under the Internal Revenue Code the treat-
ment of the various aspects of insurance has hardly adhered to a logical
principle. Owing in part to the timidity of legislators in dealing with a
matter which they did not clearly understand, and perhaps in part to ef-
fective lobbying by the insurance interests, insurance has in general been
less heavily taxed than other types of enterprise, sources of income, and
forms of property.
Two distinct phases of the insurance taxation problem are the treatment
of insurance proceeds and premiums in the income tax return of the indi-
vidual or business insured-, and the treatment of insurance companies and
their stockholders under the corporation and individual income taxes.
While the tax on insurance companies has received the greatest amount
of attention from the legislature, it is in the treatment accorded the in-
sured that the violation of economic principles and canons of taxation is
most patent and the language of the statute and regulations most vague.
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
Fire and Casualty Insurance
One of the least complicated aspects of the problem is the treatment of
fire and casualty insurance in computing the income tax of the policy-
holder. The most straightforward case of this type is the insurance of
business property. Under the present federal law premiums paid are
deductible as a business expense ;1 losses covered by insurance may not
be deducted,' while indemnity payments made to the insured are not
counted as income.' This treatment is satisfactory when the loss which
would be deductible if no insurance had been purchased is the same as
the insurance recovered. When, however, there is a discrepancy between
the two figures, some adjustment is necessary. Actually the regulations
require the proceeds of an insurance policy covering loss of income from
property to be included as income to the same extent as the income they
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1. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(a)-1.
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.23(e)-1, 19.23(f)-1.
3. No specific statement to this effect could be found in the law or regulations, but
the implication is fairly direct.
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replace.4 And the regulations appear to imply that if the amount recovered
is not immediately reinvested in similar property as a replacement, it
must be treated as a realization of income and any recovery in excess
of the "adjusted basis" taxed as a capital gain.' On the whole it would
be simpler and more consistent to permit deduction of all losses, whether
or not covered by insurance, and to require all insurance proceeds to be
included in gross income. In this way several ambiguities and uncertain-
ties would be avoided, particularly those arising when there is some
doubt as to whether a claim will be paid in full by an insurance company.
Premiums paid for insurance against the loss of consumer durables,
such as insurance of an owner-occupied dwelling against fire, may not be
deducted under the present law,' and this rule appears to be sound. Not
only is the premium a purely personal expense connected with services to
the taxpayer, but if such a deduction were permitted, the existing dis-
crimination against lessees would be increased, for although rent ordinar-
ily includes the cost of insurance, a lessee can make no deduction for it.-
The difficulty with this treatment is that the person who does not insure
and who suffers a loss is permitted to deduct the loss, while the insured
is allowed no deduction from his income.8 Thus in providing against an
insurable calamity which occurs on the average once every ten years, A
who insures and pays premium of $100 every year for ten years gets no
deduction on his income tax return, while B who does not insure but pays
out $1,000 every ten years to make good the damage is able to take this
loss as a deduction from his income. This is at least one case in which,
despite the much protested deterrent effect of taxes on risk-taking in new
business ventures, the law encourages the taxpayer to take risks.
In order to avoid entirely discriminations between the insurer A, the
non-insurer B, and the lessee C, either B must be denied the privilege of
deducting the loss, or an amount roughly corresponding to the premium
for insurance against this loss must be included in his taxable income
each year. Inclusion of such a hypothetical insurance premium would
create a difficult administrative problem, particularly since it would be
4. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.22(a)-7, ,3 (crop insurance), 19.112(f)-1, 54 (in
a section dealing with capital gains from involuntary conversiuns).
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112(f). The adjusted basis is to be determined ac-
cording to section 113, IxzT. REv, CODE (1939) (unless otherwise indicated, sections
hereafter cited will be the latest applicable sections of the basic tax system in either the
Internal Revenue Code or subsequent amendments).
6. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.24-1.
7. For example, the home owner may deduct both mortgage interest and proper(y
taxes while the renter may make no deduction, even though a substantial part of his rent
is used by the landlord to cover these items.
8. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(e)-1c. It is not specifically so stated, but pre-
sumably where the insurance covers only a part of the loss, the part not compensated
for would be deductible.
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appropriate to include only the pure risk part of the premium and to ex-
clude any loading for expenses or profit. Because of the large variety of
losses possible, it would probably be necessary, in order to determine which
premiums should be included in the taxpayer's income, to require him to
declare in advance which losses he would want to deduct should he suffer
them in the future. The impracticability of such a solution is evident.
Further, the line between the accidental destruction of consumer goods
and destruction in the normal course of use may be extremely tenuous.
For example, the writer has frequently risked the theft of property more
or less deliberately for the sake of greater convenience in its use. Thus
an allowance for such losses may permit deductions which are of doubtful
justifiability. The present law certainly tempts the wealthy to refrain
from insuring and even to neglect to protect property from risk of loss.
For in the event of loss the income tax deduction will absorb such a large
part of it that protection may cost more than it is worth to the taxpayer
as an individual, even though for the community as a whole it may be
highly desirable.
Permitting no deduction for losses may produce hard cases among those
with relatively small incomes, yet for persons subject to high rates of tax
the present practice produces too severe a discrimination against those
taking precaution against risk. As a reasonable compromise, deduction
of losses could be allowed only for normal tax purposes, or when, as at
present, the surtax extends to all taxpayers, a tax credit could be provided
at a rate equal to the sum of the normal tax and first bracket surtax rates.
This solution would be administratively simple, would relieve the hard-
ship cases and would reduce the more extreme discriminations to toler-
able levels.
Accident and health insurance and employees' compensation present a
different problem. At present benefits received from this type of insur-
ance are specifically excluded from gross income.' So far as these bene-
fits cover only medical and hospital expenses connected with accident or
illness, such insurance is on a par with other forms of casualty insurance.
But the benefits also extend to replacing in some measure income lost
through enforced idleness resulting from accident or sickness. This part
of a benefit should rightly be included in income just as benefits paid under
a "use and occupancy" insurance contract are included in the case of a
business. To avoid the necessity of apportioning insurance benefitO, it
may be desirable, however, to require the entire amount of the benefit to
be included in income, and to permit medical expenses above a certain
normal level to be deducted separately."
9. Section 22(b) (5).
10. Pub. L. No. 753, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 21, 1942) (hereafter citcd as Pub.
L. No. 753) inserts subsection 23(x) in the Internal Revenue Code to provide for the
deduction of the excess of medical expenses over 5 per cent of net income, with a limit on
[Vol. 52 : 554
1943] INSURANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 557
If benefits are included in income, accident and health insurance, pre-
miums should be deductible in order to prevent discrimination in favor of
the non-insurer who puts aside savings for a rainy day and need not
report as income his drawings on these savings in time of need. Unlike
the case of the lessee and the home-owner, in which deduction of pre-
miums would have introduced a discrimination, permitting this deduction
would eliminate rather than produce a differential between the person who
purchases insurance directly and the one for whom it is purchased by a
third party.
The question may well arise at this point whether some distinction
should not be made between the pure risk portion of the premium which
is used to pay benefits and the part required for defraying overhead ex-
penses and paying profits. This latter part represents actual resources
which are used in providing the service to the policyholder, as distin-
guished from the mere transfer of funds from some policyholders to others
in accordance with their relative needs as measured by the occurrence or
non-occurrence of some disaster. In principle, the appropriate treatment
of this portion of the premium appears to depend upon whether the
activity giving rise to the occasion for insurance is one of obtaining
income or spending it. When under two different modes of earning a
livelihood the amount of insurance required to provide a certain amount
of security and closeness of timing between income and need differs, the
difference in overhead insurance expenses should not be permitted to
produce a difference in tax. On the other hand, if the overhead insur-
ance expenses are incurred because the taxpayer chooses to spend his
income in a way which involves a risk it is deemed worthwhile to insure
against, rather than in a way involving no such risk, the expenses are
personal and should be included in income. For the sake of simplicity,
however, it will probably be desirable to ignore such fine distinctions and
treat the overhead element of the premiums in the same way as the risk
element, thus avoiding any necessity for an apportionment of the pre-
mium which would greatly confuse the taxpayer.
Another consideration which enters into the treatment of casualty
insurance in the individual return is the fact that certain forms of insur-
ance are often purchased for long periods in advance. The tax avoid-
ance made possible by such purchases may be seen in its most extreme
the amount of the deduction of $2,500 for a joint or head cf family return and $1,20
for other returns. Section 22(b) (5) is also amended by this section so as to imply that
accident and health insurance proceeds are to be included in income up to the amount
of this deduction.
To prevent abuses similar to those arising in the case of losses to personal propety,
it would be advisable to make this allowance in the form of a tax credit at a rate equal
to the combined first bracket rate. If this is done the maximum limit on the allowanee
might be increased or removed entirely.
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form in the so-called perpetual plan of writing insurance. Under this
plan the insured pays an initial premium deposit several times greater
than the normal annual premium, so that the interest earned from the in-
vestment of this deposit by the company will be large enough to pay losses
and expenses. In mutual companies interest from the invested deposit is
usually sufficient to provide, in addition, for the payment of substantial
annual dividends to the policyholders out of the excess of investment
income over losses and expenses. On the termination of the policy the
premium is refunded to the insured. This is a very sound method of
writing insurance, for it creates an extremely large fund from which
conflagration or disaster losses may be met, and it reduces the expense of
annual renewal and premium collection."
In modern times the method has acquired the added advantage of
affording the policyholders a substantial tax saving. For example, A and
B may each have a $1,000 bond bearing $30 a year interest. A uses this
interest to pay the annual premium on an ordinary fire insurance policy on
his house. B, on the other hand, sells his bond and with the proceeds pays
the initial premium deposit on a perpetual type insurance policy. A must
pay a tax on the $30 interest, but B under present law has no tax to pay
on the insurance coverage which he gets as a direct return in kind on his
investment of $1,000 in the original premium deposit. A similar but less
striking discrimination occurs when insurance is paid for in advance for
say three or five years and the premium is, or at least should be, reduced
to allow for interest which accrues on it before it is needed to pay losses
and expenses. The proper remedy, of course, is to require the interest
to be included in the income of the policyholder.
In the case of stock companies the law may well specify the rate of
interest to be used in computing the amount of income to be so included,
since variations among companies in the rate of return on investments
tend to affect the return to the stockholder rather than the premium
charged the policyholder. As to mutual companies, where variations in
the rate of return on investments may affect dividends paid to the policy-
holder, it would seem appropriate, in principle at least, to require a report
to each policyholder of his share of the interest actually earned (plus
an allowance at a statutory rate for earnings of capital invested directly
in insurance plant and working capital) and to include this share in his
taxable income. In practice, however, this procedure would involve diffi-
culties. Thus specification of an arbitrary rate of interest would seem
advisable in this case also, for it would reduce the burden of compliance
and administration and would at the same time be reasonably accurate.
11. This method is the one used by the oldest insurance company in the United
States, The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss by
Fire. Despite its advantages, it has not achieved widespread coverage, owing in part to
the difficulty for most people of putting up the large initial premium deposit.
[Vol. 52: 554
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In any event, in order to avoid multiplying picayune adjustments to in-
come, it may be desirable to include interest on premiums in taxable
income only when premiums are paid for more than one year in advance.
In the case of business insurance, whether this interest is a factor to
be taken into account depends primarily on whether the cost of insur-
ance is accounted for on a cash or on an accrual basis. When a strictly
cash basis of accounting is used and the premium deposit is deducted
as a cost in the year in which it is made, perpetual insurance results in a
postponement of the time for reporting as income an amount equal to the
premium deposit. The gain from such a postponement is equal to the
interest on the tax, and so the levying of a tax on the interest on the pre-
mium would just offset the advantage. Most concerns, however, report
income more nearly on an accrual than on a cash accounting basis, and
in the case of perpetual insurance and insurance of the "factory mutual"
type, 2 accrual accounting is almost always required. When accrual ac-
counting is employed, the income is reflected in the proper periods, and
no avoidance results from large premium deposits. There would appear,
therefore, to be little occasion for adding interest on premiums to the
income of business policyholders.
The treatment of interest on premium deposits is closely related to the
treatment of "dividends" (also frequently termed "savings," "profits"
or "premium deposits") returned to policyholders. When the cost of
insurance purchased constitutes a business expense, no problem arises,
for it is of no moment whether the item of dividends is treated as income
in its own right or merely as a reduction in a deductible cost item; the
net income will be the same in either case. But where the premium is not
deductible, as in the insurance of consumer durables, the treatment does
make a difference, and the problem raised is a rather difficult one. The
regulations provide that dividends "which may be credited against the
current premium" are not taxable.' 3 But since there is no annual premium
against which dividends on perpetual policies may be credited, this exclu-
sion does not apply to them.
The whole problem is in fact but one aspect of the general problem of
the treatment of cobperatives and their patronage dividends. If A, a
member of a co6p, purchases goods for $100, and receives a $10 dividend
at the end of the year, should this dividend or any part of it be included
in his income? The law and regulations are silent on the point, and it
appears that such dividends are not included. But A is obviously better
off than B who purchases the same goods at a regular store for $100 and
12. The "factory mutual" companies insure primarily large factory risks, and require
an initial premium deposit many times the ordinary annual premium, but less than the
perpetual premium deposit-returning at the expiration of the policy S0 per cent or more
of the deposit, depending on the duration of the coverage.
13. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-12.
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receives no dividend. Hence it would appear equitable to require A to
pay a higher income tax. On the other hand, what about C who goes to a
cut rate store and buys the same goods for $90, with somewhat less ser-
vice, or D who is a more expert shopper and manages to get both goods
and service for $90? No easy solution to the problem is available, but
the balance of considerations seems to be on the side of treating the divi-
dend as an individual economy in consumption which it would be unwise
to tax. This conclusion is particularly true in view of the possibility of
having to deal with E who is a member of a co6p which charges $110
and pays a dividend of $20. Most mutual life insurance policyholders are
actually in this position. In order to tax such a dividend, it would be
necessary to undertake the extremely difficult task of apportioning it
between the return of an initial overcharge and the distribution of a net
saving or "profit." Possibly some part of the $10 dividend received by A
may be attributed to the fact that he previously purchased shares in the
co6p, and thus made a capital investment upon which lie received a return
roughly equivalent to the interest he might have received had lie invested
the same sum in other ways. Mutual insurance company dividends can
best be dealt with by including as a separate item in income that part of
them which is interest on a capital sum. Otherwise it seems on the whole
that dividends of mutual insurance companies should not be included in
the income of the taxpayer.
Life Insurance
The proper treatment of life insurance is an even more complex prob-
lem than the treatment of casualty insurance. Life insurance is not simply
the spreading of a risk, but includes a very substantial element of saving.
Premiums paid for it can be broken down into three elements: amounts
paid for current insurance protection; savings used to build up a reserve
to supplement premiums in the later years, which in themselves will be
insufficient to provide the full insurance coverage; and loading charges
for overhead expenses. The proceeds of life insurance are also a com-
bination of three elements: the return of the accumulated savings por-
tions of the premiums; interest earned on these accumulations; and the
amount of pure insurance which was necessary to fill out the face of the
policy. 14
14. The bewildering variety of insurance policies results from combining the savings
and pure insurance elements in varying proportions. At one extreme a renewable term
policy calls for a constant amount of insurance and no savings, with a constantly rising
premium, while at the other end a single premium endowment includes a large amount
of savings and a small and decreasing amount of insurance. Ranging in between in ap-
proximate order are convertible term, "modified premium," whole life, limited payment
life, endowment, limited payment endowment, single premium life. The breakdown of
[Vol. 52:54
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In principle, at least the savings part of the life insurance contract
should obviously be treated as any other form of savings; that is, the
interest should be included in the income of the policyholder as it accrues,
but proceeds representing return of principal should not be included. An
analogy to a savings account is particularly apt in that life insurance com-
panies, except in the first few years of their policies, ordinarily make
premiums and proceeds into their elements varies over the life of the policy, the portion
of the premium going for immediate protection usually rising and the part going into the
reserve usually falling over the life of the policy (in the later years of some policies,
particularly limited payment policies, the cost of insurance protection for the current
year exceeds the premium and must be defrayed in part by drawing on the accumulated
savings). The parts of the proceeds attributable to the savings and interest elements rise
and the part which constitutes pure insurance falls over the life of the policy. The fol-
lowing table shows how this breakdown varies for a typical policy:
Analysis of prcmiumns and procccds.
$1,000 whole life non-participating policy issued at age 40.
Commissioners' 1941 Standard Ordinary mortality table, 3 per cent interest.
Initial expense: $20.70 per $1,000 face value plus 65 per cent of gross premium.
Renewal expense: $2.00 per $1,000 face value.
Gross Premium Expenses Net Premium
First year ............................ $27.15 $3.35 $-1120
Subsequent years ..................... 27.15 2.00 25.15
Disposition of Composition of Proceeds




40 -1 $6.28 $--17.48 $- .34 $-1 7.48 $- .34 $-17.82 $1017.82 $-33.6941 2 65 M5 .2 1.9 - .12 .97 999.03 -40.23
42 3 6.83 18.27 .78 19.36 .66 20.02 979.93 -41.69
43 4 7.22 17.93 1.36 37.29 2.02 39.31 960.69 -4.33
44 5 7.56 17.59 1.93 54.88 3.95 58.83 941.17 -4140
49 10 9.62 15.53 4.92 136.83 22.52 159.40 840.60 -33.83
54 15 12.27 12.88 8.03 205.84 56.42 263.26 736.74 - 9.93
59 20 15.54 9.61 11.16 261.71 105.96 367.67 632.33 29.61
64 25 19.40 5.75 14.24 293.42 171.04 469.46 530.54 84.69
69 30 23.78 1.37 17.16 314.20 251.07 565.27 434.73 154.72
74 35 28.46 - 3.31 19.82 307.09 344.96 652.05 347.95 23S.61
79 40 33.22 -8 .07 22.16 276.24 451.22 727.46 272.54 334.87
84 45 37.72 -12.57 24.12 222.25 563.05 790.30 209.70 441.70
89 50 41.57 -16.42 25.71 147.46 693.55 841.01 158.99 557.243
94 55 41.80 -16.65 27.06 61.19 826.14 887.33 112.67 679.79
95 56 39.45 -14.30 27.37 46.89 853.51 900.40 99.0 705.16
96 57 37.77 -12.62 27.77 34.27 S31.2 915.55 84.45 730.93
97 58 37.71 -12.56 23.22 21.72 909.50 931.21 68.79 757.15
98 59 39.33 -14.18 23.69 7.53 938.19 945.72 5428 7S3.84
99 60 .... 25.15 29.13 32.68 967.32 1000.00 0.00 810.97
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available to policyholders on demand a large part of the interest earned
in the form of cash surrender and loan values.' 5
The proper treatment of the pure insurance portion of the contract is
somewhat less clear. The balance of considerations, however, indicates
that this portion should be considered as a replacement of income lost
through the death of the insured, rather than as compensation for loss
of property or for abnormal expenses incurred, as are proceeds from
a fire insurance contract."0 Thus it would be proper to treat it in the same
way as the proceeds from crop or accident and health insurance, that is,
to permit the premiums to be deducted and to require the proceeds to be
included in gross income.
The portion of the premium used for overhead expenses and profit
should be treated as a deductible item also, for that part composed of
purely investment expenses is analogous to brokerage fees or other in-
vestment expenses of the individual, while underwriting expenses proper
are the result of a type of insurance which is not ordinarily related in
any direct way to the consumption outlays of the individual.
Therefore, the correct way to treat life insurance would be to permit
deduction from income of that part of the insurance premium used to pay
for current protection, but not of that part which is accumulated as a
savings deposit or reserve; to include in the policyholder's income the
net interest earned on this reserve as it accrues; and to include in the
income of the beneficiary that part of the benefit which consists of insur-
ance proper but not that part which is paid from the reserve and consists
15. Cash and loan values are usually computed from the "reserve" on the policy, which
in turn is a computation of what the accumulation of savings portions of premiums and
interest thereon would be on the basis of an arbitrary assumption as to the net premium
available to the company after allowing for expenses. The cash values in the early years
of the policy are less than this reserve by an amount somewhat inaptly termed a "sur-
render charge" which is intended to allow for the costs of writing the policy. Under the
present regulations of most states, this charge may not exceed $25 per $1,000 face value
of policy. After an initial period of, typically, from ten to twenty years, the surrender
charge is dropped and the surrender value is equal to the full reserve. It must be noted,
however, that new methods of computing minimum surrender values have been pro-
posed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (December, 1942) and
have been embodied in bills which have already been introduced in legislatures of sev-
eral of the more important insurance states. These new methods give a surrender value
not necessarily related to the reserve; they are to be mandatory, however, only on policies
issued after 1945.
16. While some part of the proceeds may be used to defray funeral expenses, this
is ordinarily not the primary purpose of life insurance taken out by those subject to the
income tax. Even to the extent used for such funeral expenses, life insurance is hardly
to be classed with insurance of a home against fire, for funeral outlays can be varied
according to taste and must be borne sooner or later by all while the loss imposed by a
fire is definite and occurs only to a few.
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of the savings of the policyholder and the accumulated interest already
taxed to him. When the proceeds are paid in a single lump sum, the tax-
able pure insurance part could legitimately be spread over a period cor-
responding to the remaining productive period of the insured had he
lived. In this way it would be possible to avoid concentration of income
in a single year merely because the future earning power of the insured
has become capitalized through the payment of the policy. For the same
reasons stated in the discussion of casualty insurance, it would in princi-
ple be appropriate to use a statutory rate of interest in computing the
interest portion when stock companies are involved; and in the case of
mutual companies, the actual rates of return obtained by them.
In the aggregate, under such a method of taxation, the amount of pre-
miums deductible as paying for current protection would approximately
offset the amount of proceeds includible as pure insurance. The net ag-
gregate amount added to taxable income through life insurance would
thus be approximately equal to the interest received by life insurance
companies on the investment of their reserves less their overhead expenses.
In contrast to this rather large amount that should theoretically be taxable,
very little income received through the medium of life insurance is taxed
under the present federal law. While no part of life insurance premiums
is deductible in computing net income, 1- proceeds of policies paid by
reason of the death of the insured are specifically exempt from income
tax ;18 and of proceeds obtained through the surrender or maturity of the
policy during the lifetime of the insured, only the excess over the entire
amount of premiums paid is taxable.' 9 In most of the usual forms of life
insurance, the cost of the pure insurance protection which the insured
enjoys during the life of the policy exceeds the interest on the reserve,
so that the proceeds available to a living policyholder are almost always
less than the amounts paid in and there is no taxable income. Moreover,
even in the rare case where some taxable income does exist, it is always
much less than the amount of interest earned, and because of the infre-
quency of such cases the income is often overlooked and not reported.
Thus life insurance is unduly favored under the income tax, particu-
larly those forms with the greatest savings and tax-free interest elements.
By this tax advantage individuals are artificially induced to accumulate
their savings in the form of life insurance reserves rather than by sepa-
rate investment. The situation is in some measure analogous to the case
of the perpetual casualty policy in that interest on the reserves or on the
premium deposit is never taxed when it can be considered as used to
provide current insurance protection. This favorable treatment is also
17. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.24-1.
18. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(b) (1)-1.
19. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(b) (2)-1.
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comparable to the complete exemption granted capital gains accrued at the
death of the taxpayer, in that the accumulated interest portion of a death
claim is not taxed, even to the extent that it exceeds the cost of the pro-
tection furnished. This unwarranted advantage is the more serious be-
cause there is very little limitation on the amount of insurance which a
healthy person of large means can carry. Since by virtue of favorable
tax treatment there may be an attractive probability that the net return
from this investment will be greater than that obtainable through ordinary
channels, insurance may thus be purchased not only for actual protection
but as a speculative investment.2
Correction of this situation is not easy. A theoretical apportionment
of premiums and proceeds between expenses, investment and insurance
would require not only an apportionment of expenses between the invest-
ment and insurance functions of the company but actuarial calculations
involving assumed mortality tables, future rates of interest in invested
funds, and future renewal expenses. In the case of stock companies a
wholly arbitrary allocation of the stockholders' profits between savings
on mortality, savings in expenses, and excess investment income would
also be necessary. In any case the taxpayer could not possibly make the
separation himself, and no simple rule of thumb is available to permit a
reasonably close approximation. The apportionment would have to be
done by the insurance company and the policyholder notified of the
amount to be deducted from or added to his income on account of his
20. Single premium policies, on which the reserves and interest earnings are relatively
high, have proven a fertile field for tax avoidance that has been little cultivated by tax-
payers only because tax exempt bonds have offered a means of obtaining a similar tax
reduction which is less cumbersome and less burdened with overhead expenses. In Its
most extreme manifestations this avoidance has taken the form of borrowing on one such
single premium insurance policy in order to take out another similar policy, and repeat-
ing the process almost indefinitely. By this means the taxpayer is able to obtain a large
immediate deduction for interest paid, while he may expect to be taxed on the interest
earned on the policy reserves only partially and much later if at all. This process not
only produces an inequity in taxation, but involves a waste of resources through need-
lessly multiplying the overhead involved in the writing of such insurance. Faced with
a demand to do something, however hastily, about the more flagrant cases of this prac-
tice, Congress included in the Revenue Act of 1942 a provision that interest paid on
indebtedness incurred to purchase insurance contracts on which "substantially all the
premiums are paid within a period of four years from the date on which the contract is
purchased" would not be allowed as a deduction. Pub. L. No. 753, § 130. It was gen-
erally expected that this provision would prove even less effective than has the parallel
provision denying a deduction for interest paid on indebtedness incurred to carry tax
exempt bonds, U. S. Treas Reg. 103, § 19.23(b)-1, since not only is it difficult to deter-
mine for what purpose indebtedness is incurred or continued, but there remain many
varieties of insurance suitable for such avoidance that are not covered at all by this pro-
vision, such as 10-payment life and endowment policies.
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life insurance." With the large and almost bewildering variety of policies
which are now issued and the number of modifications possible through
the use of dividends to purchase additions to a policy, the amount of work
involved in making this apportionment would be a considerable burden
on the companies. The work could be somewhat decreased by limiting
this reporting to policies of $1,000 or over, for the number of small
("industrial") policies in the hands of income taxpayers is probably not
great; and since such policies usually carry a substantially heavier load-
ing for overhead expense than the larger ("ordinary") ones, they would
not as a rule be attractive as a deliberate means of tax avoidance. But
even then the clerical work involved would still be a heavy burden.
Some further simplification of the computations could be achieved by
treating the pure insurance portion of the contract as property insurance
rather than income insurance, and accordingly permitting no deduction
of premiums and excluding this part of the proceeds from income. Al-
though this procedure would not change the aggregate tax base or open
the door to deliberate avoidance, it would operate in a slightly inequitable
manner. For example, a widow who lives on insurance proceeds which
were designed to replace the earnings of her husband had he lived would
pay a smaller tax than a wife whose husband is still providing the income
directly. But it is not likely that a discrimination of this kind would be
generally regarded as a serious evil.
21. It might be thought that these computations are at least in part already made
for other purposes. But actually they are seldom made for individual policies, and the
basis for such computations as are made is so completely unrealistic that it would have
to be done over for tax purposes. The reserves as reported to state insurance commis-
sioners are in almost all cases computed on the basis of the "American Experience"
table of mortality, based on data of almost a century ago, in which the mortality shown
at ages 20 to 40 is as much as three times that shown by modem tables. These reserves
are moreover computed on the "net premium" basis, that is, on the assumption that the
company will receive in the future not the premium stipulated in the policy less a rea-
sonable collection expense, but what the theoretical net premium should have been accord-
ing to the obsolete mortality table. The result is that the reserves recorded for individual
policies are sometimes too large and sometimes too small, but almost never correct.
This artificial computation is not merely an immaterial accounting convention intend-
ed only to assure solvency of the company as a whole. Since surrender values are based
on the reserves, they frequently bear little relation to the equity of the policyholder in
his policy. With mutual companies the discrepancy can be and frequently is corrected
by suitable formulae for the distribution of dividends, but with the non-participating p~li-
cies of stock companies this possibility is lacking and the pulicyholder who surrenders
during the early years of the policy is often heavily penalized. However, this situation
may soon be considerably ameliorated by pending legislation. See note 15 supra. In
addition to providing more equitable surrender values, the reserve computation w.,uld h2
put on a more realistic basis. But even after this legislation is in full force (which will
take many years) reserves would still be considerably overestimated through the use of a
mortality table that, while immeasurably better than the "American &Experience" table,
still substantially overstates actual expected mortality.
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Moreover, this treatment would enhance the effectiveness of a given
amount of insurance. For example, if a given individual A and his bene-
ficiary B are both subject to a 50 per cent tax rate, A under the property
insurance treatment would be in approximately the same position with
$10,000 worth of term insurance as he would be with $20,000 of the same
insurance under the income insurance treatment. In the latter case the
net cost of insurance is cut in half by the deduction of premiums from
the tax base, and proceeds are cut in half by the tax on them, On the other
hand, since few persons carry life insurance to the point where the bene-
ficiaries are subject to as high a rate of tax as the insurer, the tax burden
would probably be somewhat greater under the property insurance treat-
ment than under the income insurance treatment.
If the departure from principle involved in treating life insurance as
property rather than income insurance were acceded to, it would only be
necessary to compute the interest on the reserve less the expenses of the
company to determine the amount to be included in the income of the
policyholder. A reasonably close approximation to the desired figure could
be obtained by applying an interest rate to the surrender value of the
policy, which is usually printed in a table on the back. The fact that in
the early years of the policy this value is less than the full reserve would
result in an approximate allowance for heavy initial expenses. Yet it
would be surprising indeed if any large number of taxpayers would or
could make this computation for themselves without mistakes, particularly
since many policies have dividend additions or other modifications which
would have to be taken into account. Therefore it would probably be
necessary to impose on insurance companies the not inconsiderable task
of computing this interest and reporting it to the taxpayers. For all
practical purposes it would probably be sufficient to make no report of any
deduction in cases where the expenses exceed the interest, and start re-
porting only when the accumulated interest begins to exceed accumulated
expenses. Such reporting would thus be automatically eliminated with
respect to most industrial policies, and during the first few years of most
ordinary policies the necessity for reporting would be obviated. The
amounts of interest-to be reported subsequently would be more substan-
tial, and annual reporting would be relatively less burdensome.
If even this procedure entailed too great a clerical burden on the com-
panies, the work might possibly be reduced still further by requiring the
amount of accumulated interest to be reported in a single lump sum at the
time of realization on the policy through loan, surrender, maturity, or
death.22 This device would, however, result in the lumping, in a single
22. On some policies that have been in effect for a long period, accumulated interest
less expenses may total to more than the surrender value or even more than the face of
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year, income which should properly be spread out over a period of years.
The postponement of the tax which would have accrued had the interest
been reported currently would work to the advantage of the taxpayer
to the extent of the interest on the tax so postponed, but lumping of in-
come might, except in cases of abnormally low income from other sources
in the year of realization, work to his disadvantage by pushing his income
into a higher surtax bracket. -3 On the whole, however, such a solution
might not be too bad as a stopgap measure. It is probably as much as can
be expected short of a shift to either a spendings tax 24 or to a comprehen-
sive averaging plan of assessment."* Even with such lump sum report-
ing it might still be necessary to exempt industrial policies.
Annuities issued by life insurance companies present a problem that is
the obverse of insurance. In a single premium annuity the annuitant
pays the company a fixed capital sum and receives a fixed annual payment
as long as he lives. This annual payment is composed of three parts: the
return of a portion of the capital sum deposited, the interest on the bal-
ance of this sum, and an amount representing the premium paid by the
life insurance company to cover the escheat of the balance of the capital
to the company should the annuitant die during the year. This premium
portion may be regarded as the individual's share of a distribution among
the policy. To avoid requiring the taxpayer to include in one year's income more than
the proceeds of the policy, ii would be desirable to tax interest accruals on policies where
the accumulated interest exceeds the surrender value.
23. In general, realization seems more likely to fall in a year of low income since loans
or surrenders are more likely to be made in such periods, and endowments are likely
to mature when the insured is retiring. In particular this would probably be true when
a part year return is filed as a consequence of death and the tax is computed as at pres-
ent If the tax were computed by making the exemptions and surtax brackets proportional
to the fraction of the year covered by the return (as it should be), the pushing of in-
come into higher brackets would be accentuated. It will be in a relatively small number
of cases, however, that the interest earned on insurance reserves will be a sufficiently
large fraction of the annual income to make a substantial difference through pushing
the income into higher surtax brackets.
24. Under a spendings tax the treatment would be simple: the entire premium would
be deductible and the entire amount of the proceeds would be included in receipts tu be
accounted for, any reinvestment of proceeds being in turn deductible.
25. See, for fuller discussion, Vickrey, A''raging of Income for Income Tax Pr-
poses (1939) 47 J. POL Ecox. 379. The basic principle of the averaging plan there pre-
sented is that the total discounted value of tax payments over a period shall be the s-ame
for all individuals whose total income for the period would have been the same had they
been able to defer the realization of their income for tax purposes to the end of the periud
and earn interest on the taxes thus postponed. Under this plan there can be no gain or
loss to the taxpayer through the shift of income from one year to another. It would be
possible to permit all premiums to be deducted while requiring all benefits to be reported
as income, or alternatively to have all interest reported in a single lump sum, without
violence to the basic principles involved.
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surviving annuitants in a given age group of the residual capital of an-
nuitants in that group who have died during the year.20
Under the present law, annuities are subject to tax to the extent of
3 per cent of the initial capital sum or other consideration paid for the
annuity. But after a sum equal to the capital or other consideration paid
for the annuity has been returned tax-free to the annuitant, the entire
annuity becomes taxable. 7
In principle the return of the capital of the annuitant obviously is not
income; the interest paid on the residual capital clearly is; and although
the premium or share in the distribution of the capital of dying annuitants
26. The following table shows how the annual payment breaks down into these coin-
ponents, and the amounts of the annuity that would be taxable under various treatlent,.:
Composition of Annuity Payments and Amounts Taxable.
Single premium straight life annuity of $100 issued at age 40.
1937 Standard Annuitants mortality table; 3 per cent interest.
Expenses: 7,/2 per cent of gross premium.
Gross premium ............................................ $2,110.69
Expenses ............................................... . 15831
Net premium .............................................. 1,952.38
Net value under gift tax regulations ........................ 1,509,30




40 1 $32.63 $ 8.54 $58.83 .... .... $63.32 $45,28
41 2 33.07 9.07 57.86 .... .... 63:32 45.28
42 3 33.50 9.61 56.89 $15.27 $42.49 63.32 ,15.28
43 4 33.91 10.18 55.91 55.91 66.09 63.32 45.28
44 5 34.31 10.79 54.90 54.90 65.69 63.32 45,28
49 10 35.96 14.28 49.76 49.76 64.04 63.32 45.28
54 15 36.97 18.61 44.42 44.42 63.03 63.32 45.28
59 20 37.17 23.83 39.00 39.00 62.83 63.32 45,28
64 25 36.43 29.92 33.65 33.65 63.57 63.32 45.28
69 30 34.72 36.80 28.48 28.48 65,28 63.32 45.28
73 34 32.67 42.75 24.58 24.58 67.33 63.32 84.94
74 35 32.08 44.27 23.65 23.65 67.92 63,32 100.00
79 40 28.69 52.05 18.26 18.26 70.31 63.32 100.00
84 45 24.82 59.76 15.42 15.42 75.18 63.32 100,00
89 50 20.87 66.98 12.15 12.15 79.13 63.32 100,00
94 55 17.80 72.80 9.40 9.40 82.20 63.32 100.00
97 58 17.87 74.27 7.86 7.86 82.13 80.07 100,00
99 60 17.68 75.50 6.82 6.82 82.32 100.00 100,00
104 65 15.69 79.89 4.42 4.42 84.31 100.00 100.00
The composition of the annuity will be the same at a given age of tie annuitant re-
gardless of when the annuity was taken out. This applies, however, only to straight life
annuities.
2Considering the expenses as being concentrated in the first year.
27. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (b) (2) -2.
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may be considered income by some, less discrimination results if this item
is excluded. If, for example, a group of prospective annuitants of the
same age and with equal capital were to execute wills leaving their estates
in equal shares to the survivors in the group and were to spend each year
what they would receive as an annuity from an insurance company, the
amounts transferred to the others on the death of any of the group would
certainly not be included in income. If the mortality of the group followed
that expected by an insurance company and if there were no difference
between the overhead expenses of the group and of the company. the
results obtained would be the same as though annuities had been pur-
chased through the company. In general it would seem that if the pre-
mium is included in income, the loss incurred when an individual dies and
his capital is forfeited should be deductible. But since at the death of the
annuitant there is seldom any simple way of taking advantage of this
deduction, the more equitable method is to ignore these gains and losses.
Under the present law, only those living considerably longer than the
average expectation of life will in most cases have their capital returted
to them tax-free; many will have only a part of it and none will have more
than it so returned. The law would cause an individual who in the absence
of any tax would be undecided whether to take out an annuity or manage
his capital himself to choose the latter course."z Including tile premium
28. A further irregularity arises under the present law in the case of philanthropic
annuities, where the donor, typically a person uf small capital and nu dependents, gives a
sum to a philanthropic agency in return for an annuity st,mewhat smaller than could be
obtained from an insurance company. The donor is thereby provided with an income tt-
replace that obtained from the investment of the amount given, and a portiun Uf the gift is
made available for immediate philanthropy. Since the cnsideration paid fur such an
annuity is indeterminate, the practice is to value such annuities, both for the purpose of
determining the amount to be considered a deductible gift in the current year's income
tax return and for the purpose of determining the amount of the annuity to be taxed in
subsequent years, according to the table used for the valuation of life interests under
the estate and gift taxes. This table is based on the Actuaries Combined Experience
Mortality Table, representing British experience in the early part Cof the nineteenth cen-
tury, with 4 per cent interest. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(7) (1938 ed.). See als.,
id., table at 27-28; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10(1) (3). This table greatly overstates the
mortality to be expected under modern conditions, and consequently annuities are under-
valued and remainders are overvalued. The discrepancy between the valuation of philan-
thropic annuities and thoge purchased from life insurance companies directly is further
increased by the lack of any loading for expenses in this table. The result is that the
purchaser of a philanthropic annuity is able to obtain the return of his capital tax-free
somewhat more rapidly than the annuitant who deals directly with the insurance com-
pany and separately makes an outright gift of the difference in cost. since nut only is the
amount of the deductible gift larger, but the taxable part of the annuity is smaller. On the
average the holders of philanthropic annuities will have smewhat more of their capital
returned tax-free before they die than those who buy the annuity directly and contribute
the balance separately. While the treatment thus accorded involves a slight discrimina-
tion, there is probably no real harm done. However, a more consistent treatment would
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portion of the annuity in income would create a still greater bias in this
direction, while the exclusion of the premium and the taxation of the
interest portion alone would produce a tax with an approximately neutral
effect on the same individual."
Since annuities are fewer in number and usually involve larger amounts
of interest than insurance policies, it would seem practicable to require
insurance companies to inform annuitants each year of the amount of tax-
able interest, computed according to an approved modern mortality table
at a specified rate, to be included in income.8
0
INCOME TAX ON INSURANCE COMPANIES
Stock Fire and Casualty Companies
Although questions concerning the treatment of insurance in the indi-
vidual return can be resolved by reference to fairly well-defined principles
of equity and non-discrimination, the treatment to be accorded insurance
companies under a corporation income tax depends in large measure upon
the philosophy by which that tax is itself justified. At present, the cor-
poration income tax in this country is no longer equivalent to a collection
at source of individual income taxes, as it was in a rough way prior to
1934, or as it still is in a much more refined way in England. Nor is it
to any extent a tax on the tax avoidance possibilities of the corporation,
as are the largely hypothetical punitive surtaxes on personal holding com-
panies and companies improperly accumulating surplus, and as the ill-
fated undistributed profits tax was intended to be. About the only justi-
fication that can be presented for the corporation income tax in its present
form is the purely opportunistic one that it is politically popular, pro-
ductive of revenue, and not too difficult to administer.
be preferable and relatively easy to attain, for since there is nothing in the law concern-
ing the table of mortality to be used, a more realistic table could be substituted by mere
administrative regulation. The use of a more modern table would also be desirable for
estate and gift tax purposes, and far more important. The same table is not necessarily
appropriate for both purposes, however, since mortality among annuitants is probably
lower than among the population as a whole or even among persons involved in estate
and gift taxes.
29. The table in footnote 26 supra shows the amount of an annuity taxable under
various methods.
30. This computation is relatively simple. For the ordinary life annuity all that is
necessary is to multiply the amount of the annuity by a factor depending only on the
age of the annuitant. The only reason for not putting a table of such factors in the law
or regulations would be the prevalence of annuities with minimum term or refund fea-
tures that must be specially evaluated. Other approximations have been suggested, but
on the whole no gain in simplicity of administration sufficient to outweigh the departure
from the theoretically proper treatment appears to be provided. See WATSON, Income
Tax on Annuity Payments in TRANSACTIONS OF THE AcTUARIAL SOC. OF Amz., May,
1940.
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But by whatever criterion the matter be judged, insurance is at this
level also relatively lightly taxed. Insurance companies are divided fo r
purposes of taxation into three groups: life insurance companies, taxed
under sections 201-203; stock fire and casualty companies, tax(d under
section 204; and mutual fire and casualty companies, which, if not exempt
under subsection 101(11) are technically taxed under sectiun 207. In
the taxation of stock fire and casualty companies, which is most like other
corporation taxation, the tax base, with but minor modifications, has since
1921 been approximately net income as shown on the statements filed with
the insurance commissioners of the various states. These commissioners
are, however, interested primarily in preserving the solvency cof companies
and protecting policyholders, and so they tend to evaluate assets conserva-
tively and to overstate liabilities. This bias generally results in an under-
statement of income in periods of growing business and in an overstate-
ment of income in periods of declining business. Among the important
liability items are reserves for unearned premiums and for unpaid losses,
additions to which may be deducted in computing net income. Converse-
ly amounts released from these reserves when they are reduced are treated
as income.3"
The unearned premium reserve represents the liability of the company
to service policies during the unexpired period for which premiums have
been paid in advance. At present this reserve is in most cases arbitrarily
fixed at one-half the gross premiums received on policies in effect at the
end of the year. This figure would be approximately correct if policies
were written uniformly throughout the year and if the expenses of ser-
vicing them were uniformly distributed over their lives. But actually up
to 30 per cent or more of the gross premiums goes to pay for the immediate
expenses of commissions and putting the business on the books. Thus of
a $100 premium on a one-year policy written July 1, $30 is spent imme-
diately for commissions and other underwriting expenses, and $35 goes
towards losses and adjustment expenses for the first six months. The
balance which must be held as of December 31 to cover the losses and
expenses of the final six months is $35 rather than $50 as computed by
the formula. However, a company writing all its business in December
requires about $67 per $100 of premiums to meet losses over an average
of 23/24ths of the year, while one writing all its business in January needs
only $3, as compared with the $50 allowed, to cover losses and expenses
during the remaining period, which averages about two weeks.
A somewhat similar situation exists with respect to the reserve for un-
paid losses, which represents the liability of the insurance company for
losses which have already occurred but which have not yet been settled.
The evaluation of this reserve necessarily involves some guesswork al-
31. Sections 204(b) (5), 204(b) (6).
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though previous experience frequently furnishes a reasonable basis for
estimation. As reported to state commissions, this reserve must be at
least a certain percentage of the premiums on the business, the percentage
varying with the class of business. In practice percentages are usually
high enough so that the reserve arbitrarily set is much in excess of any
amount shown by case analysis. And if analysis of reported claims on a
case by case basis warrants, it must be even larger. The Bureau of Inter-
nal Revenue has been upheld in insisting that the case basis be used when
it shows a lower reserve than the percentage of premiums basis, It might
be possible to go even further where the case basis reserve has in tile past
proved too high and reduce this reserve on the basis of experience on the
business of previous years. However, in computing the income, it is neces-
sary to avoid the temptation to consider developments between the end
of the year when the reserve was set up and the time of the tax return's
review. Such a procedure would go beyond the proper requirements of
the concept of accrual of income and would be analogous to taxing as a
capital gain not merely the excess of actual market value over cost but
what the excess of market value should have been had certain later de-
velopments been foreseen. Nevertheless, methods of computing this
reserve for unpaid losses will bear re-examination, even though the infla-
tion of this reserve is neither as definite nor as easily corrected as the un-
earned premium reserve.
The overstatement of these two reserves causes a general postponenlent
of income and an arbitrary concentration of income in certain years de-
pending on fluctuations in the volume of business. For example, recent
losses of business suffered by automobile liability companies because of
gasoline and tire rationing have reduced their reserves and converted into
taxable income profits previously concealed in them. Thus many of these
companies have actually been subject to excess profits taxes in a tine of
reduced business. On the other hand, recent increases in the business and
profits of employees' compensation companies have been hidden in in-
creased reserves and these companies have for the time being been rela-
tively free of tax. Were tax rates steady, this overstatement of liabilities
would save the company a relatively small sum consisting of the interest
on the tax so postponed. But when rates fluctuate and an excess profits tax
is levied, the results may be extremely inequitable. The proper remedy
is to require the reserves to be computed for tax purposes in a more real-
istic way, such as using the net premium after deducting underwriting
expenses as a basis for computing the unearned premium reserve, and
computing this reserve on the basis of the business of each month sepa-
rately. At the time of transition companies should not, however, be al-
lowed to use a reserve in the beginning of the year different from that at
which they closed the preceding year, lest some income escape taxation
entirely. On the other hand, the transition might well be spread over say
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five years since inclusion of income revealed by the restatement of the
reserves in the return of a single year would in itself involve inequities.
Muttal Fire and Casualty Con paides
In the taxation of mutual fire and casualty companies the situation is
somewhat more complex. Until 1942, almost all such companies were
specifically exempt under section 101 (11 ) of the IntLirnal Revenue Code,
and even those not so exempt paid no tax, since they were allowed to
deduct "premium deposits returned to their policyli lders" and "retained
for the payment of losses, expenses and reinsurance reserves." a In
mutual companies it is difficult to maintain that premiums could be retained
for any other than the stated purposes. Moreover, it was conceded by
administrative ruling that in determining the amount of premiums so
retained losses and expenses were to be considered as defrayed by invest-
ment income first and then by premium income.' Thus no taxable income
remained except when investment income exceeded hsses and expenses,
and this phenomenon occurred only in perpetual companies.3 4 They, there-
fore, paid all the tax reported as coming from mutual insurance companies
otler than life.
Stock companies had long protested against this virtual exempti.n of
their competitors. and this alleged tax discriminatin constituted aniither
bone of contention in the acrimonious relations between the two tyles of
company. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the Treasury prI losed
the changes contained in the House version of the 10t42 Revenue Revision
bill."a Under this version the exemption extended 1y section 101(11)
would have been restricted to small companies. and the larger companies
would have been taxed on what for most of them amounted to the sum
of their investment income and their addition to unapportioned surplus.
adjusted to avoid overlapping. This result would have been achieved
by restricting the deduction of dividends to that part paid out of premium
income, it being considered for this purpose that investment income is
used before premium income to pay dividends. Instead of the deduction
allowed for premiums retained to meet losses and expenses, a deduction
would have been granted for additions to unearned premiums, unpaid
32. Section 207(c) (3).
33. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.207-6.
34. For example, a company might have income consisting of $1,000 of premiums and
$100 of investment income, from which it could deduct losses and expenses of $ and0, 
premiums returned to policyholders (dividends) of say $250, leaving $50 iuf inct-me still
not offset- Of the $800 expenses. $100 is considered paid from the investment inc ,me,
leaving $700 to be defrayed from premiums. Deducting this $700 of prtmiui, ued t,-
pay losses and expenses and the $250 of premiums returned from the $1090 premiums
received leaves $50 of premiums retained to pay future losses and expen_-s, and dduct-
ing this sum from the income leaves a net taxable income of zero.
35. H. R. REP. No. 2333. 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) § 147.
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losses, and apportioned surplus. There would thereby have been exempted
from tax any addition to surplus with respect to which there was an
assurance that, subject to the prior claim of abnormal losses and expenses,
it would be returned to that group of policyholders from which it was de-
rived. On the other hand, any addition to surplus with respect to which
no such assurance existed, and any amount not distributed within a rea-
sonable time (tentatively set at five years) in accordance with the appor-
tionment, would have been taxed.
The taxation of investment income was justified as a form of collec-
tion at the source of the tax on the income of the policyholder which was
not but should have been included in his individual return. The addition
to unapportioned surplus was to be taxed on the ground that it repre-
sented a transfer of income from one group of policyholders to future
policyholders generally, or to an anonymous fund to which no individual
could acquire any enforceable or transferable claim. The exemption would
have been retained for the smaller companies partly because they were
largely farmers' organizations with strong influence in Congress and
partly to avoid burdening the managers of these companies, who are fre-
quently part time or volunteer workers, with fairly complicated computa-
tions that would produce little revenue.
The larger mutual companies objected to this proposal because too
drastic a change in their methods of operation would be required for
them to take advantage of the apportioned surplus provisions, because the
plan would bring demands from policyholders for larger dividends and
because the proposal would generally hinder the accumulation of "free
surplus" which they alleged to be essential f6r the adequate protection of
policyholders and the expansion of business. It was pointed out that cer-
tain non-dividend paying companies would pay a smaller tax than com-
parable dividend paying companies, since investment income, instead of
becoming a taxable portion of the dividend, would perforce be offset
against expenses or overlap the addition to surplus. And it was also
asserted that the existing exemption should be continued, since mutual
companies were "non-profit" organizations.
After much pulling and hauling among the representatives of the
various types of mutual companies, the staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue, the Senate Finance Committee, and the Treasury,
there was finally incorporated in the Revenue Act of 1942 a section tax-
ing most mutual insurance companies on either their net investment in-
come at the corporation rates, or oi the sum of their net premiums (after
deduction of dividends) and gross investment income at 1 per cent, which-
ever method produced the larger tax. Exemptions were provided for small
and medium sized companies with gross receipts less than $75,000, or net
investment income less than $3,000, and special notch rates were created
for companies just above these exemptions. Reciprocal insurers and inter-
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insurance exchanges were to be taxed only on their investment income,
however, and such companies with less than $50,000 investment income
were exempted.3" Of the other companies, it was expected that only the
perpetual and the "factory mutual" ones would normally be taxable on
the investment income basis, the bulk of the companies being taxable on
the gross income basis. There would seem to be no logical reason for
this final result other than a desire to derive revenue from this source in
a way which would bear at least some superficial resemblance to the cor-
poration income tax and still not be too objectionable to the companies.
Life Insurance Companies
The treatment of life insurance companies under the Revenue Act of
1942 is so peculiar that it can be understood only by reference to the his-
torical development of these provisions. Prior to 1921 the taxation of
life insurance companies was a matter of considerable confusion. In 1921
attempts to simplify the application of the income tax to life insurance
companies led to provisions taxing them on their investment income alone
and of this income exempting a sum deemed necessary to maintain re-
serves at the levels required by state insurance regulations designed to
assure payment of policies when due. The amount of this exemption was
set at 4 per cent of the reserves "required by law." 3T Representatives
of the business in return for this favorable treatment agreed that their
interest on government bonds should not be specifically exempt, since the
exemption was considered covered by the reserve earnings deduction.
This result was achieved by the devious method of permitting deduction
of only the amount by which the 4 per cent of reserves exceeded the tax
exempt interest. In 1928 the United States Supreme Court held that this
device was merely a method of taxing exempt interest by indirection, and
was therefore unconstitutional.3 8 As a result the insurance companies
were accorded even more favorable treatment than that originally granted.
In 1932 Congress made an attempt to adjust the law to this decision.
The House version of the revenue bill of that year proposed to reduce the
36. Pub. L. No. 753, § 165.
37. The phrase "required by law" might ordinarily be thought to mean the minimum
standard set up by state laws, particularly since the regulations state that "a ctmpany is
permitted to make use of . . . the highest aggregate reserve called for by any state . . .
in which it transacts business." Actually, while there is no state in which "American
Experience" 3% per cent preliminary term reserves would nut be acceptable, cjmpanies
have been allowed to use for income tax purposes whatever reserves were standing on
their books, which in some cases are as much as 15 per cent higher (fur emmple, the
3 per cent level premium), apparently on the ground that since the consent of the com-
missioner is ordinarily required before a change in the reserve standard may be made,
this amounts to being "required by law."
38. National Life Insurance Company v. United States, 277 U. S. SUS (1923) (Jus-
tices Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone dissenting).
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reserve earnings allowance from 4 per cent to 3 2 per cent of the re-
serves, 0 and the bill as reported to the Senate by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee proposed to use a percentage equal to the rate of interest assumed
by each company in computing its reserve.40 In the course of the debates
on these two proposals it was argued somewhat confusedly that the use
of a fixed percentage would unduly favor companies using 3 per cent in
computing their reserves (largely the mutual companies) and that the use
of rates assumed by the companies would unduly favor those using 3Y
per cent (largely the stock companies, most of which were small com-
panies). Although the actual examples posed were of doubtful compara-
bility and failed to prove these contentions, both points were well taken.
A company may within limits select the rate of interest it wishes to use
in computing the reserve without altering to any substantial extent the sig-
nificant terms of the policy; and the higher the rate chosen, the smaller
the reserve. The difference in the reserve for a company with a typical
distribution of business is considerably less than in inverse proportion
to the rate of interest used in computing them, so that 32 per cent of
a reserve computed at 3Y2 per cent is somewhat more than 3 per cent
of a reserve computed at 3 per cent. Use of a fixed rate, however,
produces less discrimination in most cases than the use of an assumed
rate. It was also argued that the companies were entitled to deduct
the actual interest added to the reserve. This idea was somewhat irrele-
vant, however, in view of the arbitrary way in which the interest factor
is chosen and the absence of any close relation between the significant
terms of the policy and the interest assumed in computing the reserves.
In the bill as finally passed, Congress apparently gave the companies the
benefit of the very considerable doubt still in their minds and provided for
the use of a fixed 34 per cent of the reserves except for the small amount
of business still on the books at rates of 4 per cent or more on which 4
per cent was allowed.41 The final product was thus more lenient than
either of the original proposals. Nothing was done to remedy directly
the overlapping of the reserve earnings allowance and the deduction of
tax exempt interest.
This change did not help for long, for with the general fall of interest
rates and increasingly heavy investments by insurance companies in gov-
ernment bonds, their taxable income diminished rapidly. By 1939 few
companies had paid any tax for several years, and the bulk of the tax was
being paid by two small companies that had invested heavily in mortgages
yielding a relatively high rate of return. When the revenue program for
1942 came up for consideration, the Treasury at first proposed substan-
tially the following changes:
39. H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 25.
40. SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 35.
41. Revenue Act of 1932, §203(2).
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1. The double deduction of tax exempt interest was to be eliminated
by prorating this government interest between reserves and other funds,
and reducing the reserve earnings allowance by the amount of exempt
interest allocated to reserves. It was expected that the change in the cli-
mate of opinion concerning tax exempt interest and the fact that a part
of the tax exempt interest would still be fully and separately deductible
would prevent a repetition of the National Life case.
2. In order to avoid discrimination between companies using differ-
ent rates of interest in computing reserves, a formula for computing the
reserve earnings allowance was suggested by which the rate of interest
used would be a weighted average of a fixed rate of 31 - per cent (a rough
overall average of the rates then in use) and the actual rate assumed in
computing the reserve. The weights were to be adjusted so that the
allowance would be the same for companies with a typical distribution of
business regardless of the rate of interest assumed in computing the
reserve.
3. Companies computing their reserves on the less stringent "prelim-
inary term" basis, which gives a smaller reserve than the more usual "level
net premium" basis,4 2 would be allowed for tax purposes to adjust such
reserves upward by 7 per cent.
4. The cancellable accident and health business of life insurance com-
panies was to be segregated and taxed separately in accordance with the
rules for casualty companies. Non-cancellable accident and health insur-
ance,43 however, was to be treated like life insurance."
The insurance companies through their representatives were willing
to pay the aggregate amount of taxes so levied, but objected to the way
in which the tax burden was distributed among the various companies.
After negotiation among themselves, they countered with the proposition
that the total amount of tax determined according to the Treasury pro-
posal be distributed among the companies in proportion to their net in-
42. The level premium method assumes that the net amount received by the company
after paying expenses will be the same throughout the life of the policy. The preliminary
term method allows for the initial expenses of writing the policy by assuming that the
amount available after expenses the first year will be somewhat smaller than for later
years: for most policies the amount is set as the premium for term insurance for one
year. The latter method is more realistic, but is used chiefly by the smaller companies,
most of the larger companies holding to the level premium method.
43. Non-cancellable accident and health insurance is like life insurance in that the
company must continue the policy in force as long as the premiums are paid, while a
cancellable policy cannot be renewed unless the company is willing, and may ordinarily
be cancelled on brief notice by refund of an appropriate part of the advance premium.
Such policies usually require the accumulation of a substantial reserve in addition to the
unearned premium reserve, and are subject to adverse selection.
44. Other changes were suggested which had to do with the treatment of burial
companies, assessment life insurance companies, and foreign insurance companies, and
with the limitation on the deduction of investment expenses.
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vestment income.4 5 The true brazenness of this proposal can be appre-
ciated by picturing the United States Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers getting together and suggesting
that the Treasury compute the amount it expects to receive from the cor-
poration income tax and then distribute this total levy in proportion to
the total assets, payroll, or gross receipts of the various corporations,
without reference to their rate of profit or whether in fact there was any
profit at all. Naturally a substantial majority of companies would favor
such a proposal, even though it would increase the taxes of some, for it
would result in a tax which could readily be shifted to consumers or wage-
earners. Although the Treasury proposal would not necessarily have taxed
most heavily those companies making the largest total profits, it would
have at least taxed more heavily those receiving higher rates of return
on investments or having larger surpluses. Thus there was under it a
greater likelihood that the burden would not be passed on to policyhold-
ers. Moreover, it represented a logical improvement on a method of taxa-
tion which had been in operation for twenty years. Nevertheless the
Treasury, faced with an outwardly united front on the part of the indus-
try and a restive Congress, acceded to the unique and unprecedented pro-
posal of the life insurance companies; and the Revenue Act of 1942 put
this proposal into effect by lumping all the policy liability deductions to-
gether in a single deduction to be computed by applying a flat percentage,
to be determined annually by the Secretary of the Treasury, to the net
investment income. This percentage is to be an estimate of what the
ratio of the aggregate policy liability deductions under the original Treas-
ury proposal to the aggregate net investment income for all companies
would have been for the previous year.46 For 1942, for example, the
percentage has been determined to be 93 per cent. 47 The net effect of
this rigmarole is to tax these companies at the corporation income tax
rates on a base equal to 7 per cent of their net investment income, with
this percentage varying from year to year. In spite of the fact that the
weighted average rate of interest and the other refinements devised by
the Treasury to avoid discrimination were robbed of their raison d'ttre
by this arbitrary spreading of the tax burden, the formula and the adjust-
ments were retained in the law as vestigial remnants of a hopeful attempt.
For the immediate purposes of assessing the tax this section of the law
as it now stands is the prime example of pointless complexity in the
income tax law.
45. The well-organized character of the life insurance industry is well attested to by
the degree of outward unity shown in backing this proposal. Stock and mutual com-
panies appeared to be in close agreement, in sharp contrast to the acrimonious rela-
tions between the stock and mutual casualty companies, where representatives of the two
types of company would hardly meet together in the same room.
46. Pub. L. No. 753, § 163.
47. T. D. 5188, 1942-2 Cum. Buu. 151.
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The proposal to segregate cancellable accident and health insurance
was also opposed on the ground that any attempt to allocate expenses
between the two types of business would lend to endless dispute and liti-
gation. As a substitute, it was proposed to tax such business on invest-
ment income only, but without any allowance for interest on reserves.
Such a result was to be accomplished by adding to the tax base as other-
wise computed, 34 per cent of the reserves onl such insurance, this figure
being equivalent to the amount that would be deducted through the appli-
cation of the percentage declared by the Secretary to the total net invest-
ment income. Even this principle was not followed consistently, however,
for at the suggestion of representatives of the industry and in order to
prevent companies which write on a predominantly weekly and mnnthly
premium basis from getting away with a small tax because of the low
reserves on this type of business, it was provided that the amount added
should not be less than 34 per cent of 25 per cent of the annual pre-
miums.
48
The change in the incidence of the tax burden brought about by this
change in the form of tax is not completely clear. In the case of stock
companies, it would seem that the long run result of the imposition of
this tax would be comparable to a reduction of 0.1 per cent in the rate
of return on investments, and that the premiums on new policies would
be calculated on a lower interest assumption and hince would be increased.
As all companies pay comparable taxes on similar volume of business,
regardless of profit, there will be no competitive reason why this increase
cannot be made. Thus stockholders in life insurance cumpanies will con-
tinue to be almost completely free from any corporation income tax bur-
den, except insofar as they are unable to shift the burden to non-par-
ticipating policyholders.
In the case of mutual companies it is difficult to tell what the effect of
the tax will be on the accumulation of surplus and hence to what extent
the burden will fall on the policyholders and to what extent upon this
anonymous fund. On the whole it appears probable that they will in large
measure follow the stock companies in passing on this tax to the policy-
holders, and particularly to new policyholders.
In view of the much more general disparity in taxation between incor-
porated and unincorporated business, the situation with regard to life
insurance is not too intolerable. In fact, were insurance proceeds adequate-
ly taxed to the policyholder, it would be possible to argue for more favor-
able treatment for insurance companies on the ground that those whu
insure should not be subjected to heavier taxation, even indirectly, than
those who do not. However, should any serious attempt be made to re-
integrate the corporation income tax with the individual income tax,
48. Pub. L. No. 753, § 202.
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whether in the form of collection at source of part of the income tax
or in the form of some sort of compensatory tax on undistributed profits
designed to offset the avoidance possible through the ploughing back of
earnings, a more effective method for taxing insurance companies will
have to be devised.
The problem would be particularly acute with respect to undistributed
profits. Even at present, investment in insurance companies is particu-
larly profitable for those with large incomes. Insurance companies typi-
cally plough back large fractions of their earnings, in fact they are en-
couraged and even almost compelled to do so by the regulations of state
insurance commissions. And no matter to what extent this ploughing
back of earnings is carried, no insurance company could be charged with
improper accumulation of surplus and assessed under the penalty pro-
visions of section 102 with any likelihood of success, for the company
would always have available the very appealing defense that this accumu-
lation was for the greater protection of the policyholders. As a matter of
fact, insurance companies were specifically exempt from the provisions of
the undistributed profits tax under the Revenue Act of 1936."
The principal difficulty in determining either the income or the undis-
tributed profits of a stock life insurance company is the fact that the lia-
bility represented by the reserve bulks large in relation to the income and
will only be liquidated over a very long period of time. Slight differences
well within the limits of reason in the evaluation of this liability will
produce relatively large differences in the income reported. As has been
noted before, the methods now used to evaluate this liability on the books
of the companies are far from realistic, being based on obsolete mortality
tables, fictitious future premiums, and an unrealistic allocation of expenses
over the life of the policy. Probably no reasonably uniform and realistic
evaluation of the income or undistributed profits of such companies would
be possible without recomputing the reserve, preferably using the gross
premiums, the actual renewal expenses of the company, uniform statutory
modern mortality tables, and a stipulated rate of interest. Such valuation
would require drastic changes in methods from the present net premium
method, since tables of reserve values would be so cumbersome as to be
almost useless. Even if the net premium method were accepted for the
sake of simplicity, revaluation would be a task out of all proportion to
the amount of tax involved, unless the proposed'tax valuation could be
adopted as the standard for regulatory purposes as well. In the case of
participating stock companies there would be the further complication,
at least under the gross premium method, of evaluating the liability of
the company for the payment of dividends to policyholders as future
developments warrant under policy provisions which are not always
precise.
49. Revenue Act of 1936, § 14(d) (3).
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In the case of an insurance company, whether life or casualty, which
is truly mutual in the sense that all its funds are kept apportioned to the
various groups of policyholders so that in effect no one group profits at
the expense of any other group, except through that sharing of risk that
is the essence of insurance, there is no problem other than to see that the
entire net investment income is taxed either to the company or to its
policyholders. But while in casualty insurance it may be possible to operate
in such a purely mutual fashion, as the interinsurance exchanges and the
reciprocal underwriters actually do,"' in life insurance the fact that the
policy is non-cancellable and subject therefore to adverse selection of ter-
minations by the policyholder makes this practically impossible."1 Among
50. In such organizations, which usually operate through an attorney-in-fact who
customarily takes a fixed percentage of premiums to cover expenses and his compenca-
tion, any savings realized in any year are immediately credited pro rata to the policy-
holders of that year, each of whom may have returned to him upon leaving the associa-
tion any of this accumulated savings that has not been distributed previously. There is
thus no unapportioned surplus nor any transfer from one group of policyholders to
another.
51. The difficulty may be illustrated by the following example in which, for sim-
plicity, interest and overhead expenses will be ignored. Suppose a group of 100 indi-
viduals form a mutual insurance company, each being insured for $1,000. They are all
at the time first class risks and each pays a premium of $500 to cover the first period.
During this period 20 die and are paid $20,000 in benefits, so that $30,000 remains in the
reserve fund. The remaining 80 pay another premium of $q00 for the second period,
during which 60 die and are paid $60,000 in benefits, leaving $10,000 in the re.serve at
the end of the second period. In the third period the remaining 20 pay a third $500 pre-
mium, producing a total fund of $20,000 which is just sufficient to pay the death benefit
to these 20 when they die during the third period. The $500 premium is thus just suffi-
cient to provide the required benefits.
Suppose further, however, that at the end of the first period the remaining S0 lives
are no longer on a par as regards health, but that there are two groups, one of 50 per-
sons in impaired health, of whom 45, or 90 per cent may be expected to die during the
next period and only 5 survive to the third period, while the remaining 30 are still first
class risks of whom 15, or 50 per cent will survive to the third period and only 15 die
during the second period. Suppose also that about one-third of each of these groups of
policyholders find their circumstances so changed that either because they no longer have
a closely dependent beneficiary or find the burden of premiums too heavy, they no longer
wish to continue their insurance. However, of the 17 policyholders in poor health that
have reason to discontinue their policies, 7 consider that since they have a god chance
of obtaining more from death benefits than the cost to them in premiums and whatever
surrender value they could obtain, they may profitably continue their insurance as a
speculation, even though the premium may be a little difficult to pay or the bmeficiary
a little remote. Thus actually only 10 of the impaired lives withdraw, while all 10 of
the insured in good health that have reason to withdraw will do so. The question is what
should be paid to these withdrawing policyholders as a surrender value.
If we merely divide the $30,000 reserve equally among the SO policyholders and give
each withdrawing policyholder $375, the balance remaining will be insufficient to main-
tain solvency. Of the 40 continuing impaired lives, 90 per cent or 36 will die in the
second period, and of the 20 remaining first class lives 10 would be expected to die in
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life insurance companies, therefore, a certain amount of unapportioned
surplus is amost inevitable. But mutual insurance companies, both life
and fire and casualty, commonly accumulate unapportioned surpluses
which are considerably greater than the nature of the insurance business
requires. Sometimes these accumulations merely provide a moderate
the second period, leaving a total of 14 to survive until the third period. Premium re-
ceipts are accordingly $50,000 the first period, $30,000 the second, and $7,000 the third,
a total of $87,000. Benefits payable to the 80 who do not surrender total $40,000, and
the $375 surrender values amount to $7,500, a total of $500 more than is available.
If solvency is to be preserved, therefore, only $7,000 can be distributed to surrender-
ing policyholders, or $350 each. In practice it would be a matter of guesswork how much
less than the aliquot share of the reserve should be distributed to allow for this adverse
selection. But this is still not an adequate solution. If $350 were offered as a surrender
value to the first class lives that still have reason to continue their insurance, they would
find it to their advantage to withdraw and set up a new company in which they will not
be burdened with the impaired lives. If ten of the first class lives set up a new com-
pany in which the first period premiums (corresponding to the second period of the old
company) are $750, and the second period premiums are $500, they will have sufficient
funds to pay $1,000 death benefits to the five dying the first year and the five dying the
second year. If the $350 surrender value is applied to the first year premium the net
outlay is reduced to $400, a reduction of $100 as compared to what they would have to
pay if they stayed with the old company. Thus in theory, at least, the surrender value
offered the first class lives cannot be greater than $250 without offering these policy-
holders an incentive to leave the company and set up a new one.
If the surrender value is limited to $250, and thus only $5.000 paid out, there will
remain $2,000 that will not be required to meet the obligations of the company. Equitably
this belongs to the ten surrendering policyholders with impaired lives, as this $200 each
plus the $250 surrender value would be just sufficient together with a $500 premium each
period to pay $1,000 death benefits should these policyholders form a new company and
insure again separately. This sum could of course only be paid out after a physical ex-
amination, a quite impractical procedure, both because of the expense and because of the
uncertainty as to the proper monetary value to be placed on such impairment of health
as is shown. Moreover, the need for it is slight, since the surrendering policyholder is
presumably less in need of insurance and may no longer have an insurable interest in his
life which would call for an indemnity for a reduction in life expectancy.
In practice, because of inertia and the overhead costs involved in the writing of in-
surance, the question is not as critical, and surrender values can be set considerably
higher than the amount corresponding to the $250 in this example without causing
an undue increase in the degree of adverse selection. However, there will usually remain
an element of gain from lapses and surrenders which may be considered a source of
taxable profit to the remaining policyholders. The measurement of this profit for tax
purposes, however, would involve difficulties out of proportion to the revenue involved.
Another form of adverse selection is the concentration of surrenders in years of
reduced income when security markets are likely to be depressed, thus causing the com-
pany to sell securities under unfavorable conditions or to miss investment opportunities.
This problem can be adequately dealt with, however, through the device of the termina-
tion dividend, which can be varied according to the state of the market, payable at death,
or upon maturity or surrender of the policy. Up to the present only the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company has made use of this device, so far as the writer knows, and
even here it does not seem to have been used primarily for this particular purpose.
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special contingency fund, but often they appear to be used primarily as
a means by which the directors may stimulate the growth of their busi-
ness, expand their assets, and enhance their own prestige and economic
influence. In some cases these unapportioned surpluses have reached al-
most fantastic levels, amounting in some fire and casualty companies to
several times the annual premiumsP2
It may well be considered proper to tax the additions to such unappur-
tioned surplus of mutual insurance companies on the ground that they are
transfers from one group of policyholders to another perhaps yet unin-
sured group, or at least that these additions constitute payments into a
fund which may grow indefinitely without ascertainable beneficiaries. To
the extent that the final incidence of the tax would actually be upon the
unapportioned surplus, the tax might be as nearly burdensomeless as any
tax it is possible to deviie. But an attempt to kvy a tax on such a basis
would be considerably at variance with the principles on which the rest
of the income tax is based, and the tax would be more nearly analogous
to an estate tax than to an income tax. In the case of life insurance com-
panies particularly there would be difficulty in determining just what
surplus was apportioned and what was not.
The logical application of the corporation income tax to insurance
companies is thus an extremely difficult task. Perhaps there is no com-
pletely satisfactory solution short of either a shift to the spendings tax
or to the use of comprehensive averaging. A complete shift to a spend-
ings tax would make a corporation income tax unnecessary insufar as
any interrelation with individual taxation is concerned, since accruals on
investments do not enter into the computation of spendings. For the same
reason the treatment of insurance proceeds would also be simpler. Com-
prehensive averaging of income as applied to the individual can be so de-
signed that it is a matter of indifference when income is reported ;13 un-
distributed profits are then no problem, since the proper tax will be col-
lected when the profits are eventually distributed or the equity of the
shareholder evaluated at the end of the averaging period. Hence no
special tax on corporate undistributed profits would be necessary as a
compensatory measure. The application of comprehensive averaging to
corporations likewise makes it a matter of indifference in what year
52. While on the average, fire companies have available assets on hand to meet five
or six normal years' losses, there were in 1939 two moderately large companies with
assets available to cover sixty, years of normal losses, and 2- other companies with assets
for from ten to forty years' losses. Ten of these companies, including one of the sixty
year companies, paid no dividends to policyholders; how these funds can ever bU dis-
tributed to anyone is a mystery. Similar cases, though not so striking, occur in cawualty
insurance. In life insurance it is difficult to reach any conclusion from the published
figures because of the complicated nature of dividend formulae, but quite possibly analo-
gous cases could be found.
53. See note 25 supra.
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income is reported; the vagaries of the reserves would therefore be of no
concern, and if a corporation tax "is to be continued, either as a tax on
business or otherwise, this method would probably be simpler than any
attempt at revision of reserves. But both the complete shift to the spend-
ings tax and the adoption of comprehensive averaging involve such an
alteration of the entire income tax structure as to be only remote possi-
bilities; and for the immediate future we must look to other less satis-
factory remedies.
SUGGESTIONS
The Revenue Act of 1942 made more changes in the taxation of insur-
ance than had been made in many years; yet this phase of taxation is still
in a far from satisfactory state. Nothing of any practical effect was done
about the treatment of insurance in the income tax return of the indi-
vidual. The amendments to the corporation income tax on insurance
companies slightly reduced the disparity between the taxes paid by these
companies and those paid by other corporations, but the method of assess-
ment is now further, if anything, from a logically defensible basis than
it was before.
While it may be too much to expect that the subject will be reopened
immediately, the following are some initial steps which might be taken
to improve the taxation of insurance without requiring too drastic changes
in the basic tax structure:
1. Life insurance companies should be required to report to the policy-
holder the amount of interest earned less expenses incurred whenever the
policy terminates (or previously, if the value of the policy falls below
the amount of interest because of loans, or if the accumulated interest
grows to exceed the value of the policy) ; and the policyholder should be
required to include this amount in his income.
2. Losses from fire, storm, theft, or other casualty to non-business
property should be allowed for, if at all, by a tax credit at a rate equal
to the sum of the normal tax and the first bracket surtax rates.
3. Accident and health insurance premiums should be deductible and
the proceeds from such insurance and employees' compensation benefits
should be included in gross income. The allowance for abnormal medical
expenses should be continued but possibly only as a tax credit at a rate
equal to the sum of the normal tax and first bracket surtax rates. If this
credit form of allowance is adopted, the present maximum limit on the
allowance may be increased or removed entirely.
4. Those purchasing insurance other than life for more than one
year in advance (including holders of perpetual-type policies) should be
required to include in their income the interest on the premium or un-
consumed portion thereof at a specified rate.
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5. Annuitants should be required to include in their income only the
interest earned as reported to them by the insurance companies, calcu-
lated according to an approved modern mortality table and a specified
rate of interest.
6. Philanthropic annuities (and life estates and reversions under
the estate and gift taxes) should be valued according to modem mortality
tables, both for determining the amount to be deducted as a charitable
contribution and, if the suggestion in item 5 is not adopted, for deter-
mining the amount of the annuity to be taxed.
7. If the corporation income tax is continued in its present form, the
unearned premium reserves of stock casualty and fire insurance com-
panies should be computed on a net premium basis and for the business
of each month separately. The transition between the old and new meth-
ods of computing the reserve may be spread over five years, using at the
end of the first year a reserve equal to 20 per cent of the reserve on the
new basis and 80 per cent of the reserve on the old, and so on.
8. If the present form of corporation income tax is continued, an
attempt should be made to tax stock life insurance companies on their
income from all sources, even though doing so might mean accepting a
highly artificial valuation of their reserves and setting up a seeming dis-
crimination in favor of mutual companies. At least in the long run errors
in evaluating the reserve liability will tend to cancel out.
